University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Economics Working Papers

Department of Economics

July 1999

Crowding-Out and Crowding-In Effects of the
Components of Government Expenditure
Habib Ahmed
Islamic Development Bank

Stephen M. Miller
University of Connecticut

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers
Recommended Citation
Ahmed, Habib and Miller, Stephen M., "Crowding-Out and Crowding-In Effects of the Components of Government Expenditure"
(1999). Economics Working Papers. 199902.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/199902

Department of Economics Working Paper Series
Crowding-Out and Crowding-In Effects of the Components of
Government Expenditure
Habib Ahmed
Islamic Development Bank

Stephen M. Miller
University of Connecticut

Working Paper 1999-02
July 1999

341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063
Storrs, CT 06269–1063
Phone: (860) 486–3022
Fax: (860) 486–4463
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/

Abstract
We examine the effects of disaggregated government expenditure on investment using fixed- and random-effect methods. Using the government budget
constraint, we explore the effects of tax- and debt-financed expenditure for the
full sample, and for sub-samples of developed and developing countries. In general, tax-financed government expenditure crowds out more investment than debtfinanced expenditure. Expenditure on social security and welfare reduces investment in all samples while expenditure on transport and communication induces
private investment in developing countries.
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Two different views exist on the effects of increased government expenditure on
investment. The traditional view argues that government expenditure crowds out private
investment. Higher government expenditure, whether financed with taxes or debt, increases the
demand for goods and services, raising interest rates, making capital more expensive and, as such,
reducing private investment. The non-traditional view sees government expenditure stimulating
investment. The crowding in of investment occurs when the economy’s resources are un- and
under-employed. That may arise in many developing countries where, for example, government
expenditure on infrastructure can induce private investment. We find evidence consistent with the
first view for both developed and developing countries, but consistent with the second view only
for developing countries.
Barro (1990) studies the effects of tax-financed government expenditure on investment and
output. Higher income taxes reduce the after-tax return on private investment, and thus affect
growth negatively by lowering investment. He divides tax-financed government expenditure into
spending on unproductive (consumption) services (e.g., subsidizing food) and spending on
productive services (e.g., building infrastructure), the latter of which includes resources devoted
to property-right enhancements (e.g., spending on civil services such as police). Considering those
two tax-financed expenditures, the spending on consumption services has a negative effect on
growth, while the spending on productive services affects growth positively, if the growth
resulting from private capital accumulation induced by higher public capital and enhanced
property rights exceed the negative effect of higher taxes on growth. Thus, broad measures of
government expenditure may not give the correct indication of the growth potential of certain
government services. The distinction between productive and unproductive government services
provides important information for an analysis of the effects of the government budget on capital
formation and growth. We study the effects of disaggregated government expenditure on investment
financed by both taxes and debt. In so doing, we identify types of government expenditure that
crowd-in or crowd-out investment.
Much empirical work exists that examines the effect of government expenditure on
economic growth. Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989), and Landau (1983)
employ government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP from the Summers and Heston
data base and find either a negative or no effect on the growth of real per capita GDP. Barro
(1991) adjusts the Summers and Heston data on government consumption expenditure to GDP by

subtracting government expenditure on defense and education to GDP. He notes that even that
modified measure of government consumption expenditure is far from perfect since it still includes
police and fire services that affect property rights. He also constructs a measure of government
investment expenditure to GDP. He finds that government consumption expenditure has a negative
and significant effect on the growth of real per capita GDP, but that government investment
expenditure does not have a significant effect, although the sign is positive.
Several recent papers examine the effects, if any, of the components of government
expenditure on the growth of real per capita GDP without assigning the components of government
expenditure either to productive or unproductive categories, a priori (e.g., Devarajan, Swaroop,
and Zou 1996, and Miller and Russek 1997). Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) consider a
sample of developing countries from 1970 to 1990. They discover that all candidates for
productive government expenditure either have no or a negative effect on the growth of real per
capita GDP; only current expenditure has a positive effect. Miller and Russek (1997) consider a
sample of developed and developing countries from 1975 to 1984. They find that both the method
of financing and the component of government expenditure can have different effects. To wit, debtfinanced increases in defense, health, and social security and welfare have negative effects on the
growth of real per capita GDP in developing countries while debt-financed increases in education
expenditure has a positive effect in developed countries. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) discover that
public transportation and communication investment leads to higher growth in real per capita GDP
in developing countries. While that finding seems to support the work of Aschauer (1989) on the
linkage between public and private investment, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), interestingly, cannot
find any significant relationship between public transportation and communication investment and
private investment
Miller and Russek (1997) differ from prior studies in that they separate the effects of
government expenditure based on the method of financing -- tax- or debt-financing. We follow that
strategy of considering the differences in tax- and debt-financed changes in the components of
government expenditure, but focus on the implications with respect to investment to GDP rather
than to the growth of real per capita GDP.

Some empirical studies consider the effects of fiscal variables on investment, typically
using aggregate fiscal measures.i For example, Levine and Renelt (1992) use different measures of
the government budget -- including the government consumption share of GDP, the government
consumption share less the defense and educational expenditure share, and the central government
budget surplus -- to determine their effects on investment. They conclude that none of the fiscal
variables possess a robust correlation with investmentii. While Levin and Renelt (1992) employ
cross-section regressions, Fischer (1993) performs cross-section and pooled cross-section, timeseries regressions and finds that the budget surplus associates with greater capital formation. iii
Aschauer (1989) uses time-series regressions with United States data to consider how
public investment in equipment and structures affects private investment, concluding that public
investment probably crowds in private investment. Bairam and Ward (1993) examine the
relationship, if any, between investment and government expenditure for 25 OECD countries.iv
They conclude that 24 out of the 25 countries possess a negative correlation between investment
and government expenditure, with 19 countries having a significant correlation.
With the exception of Aschauer (1989) who employs United States data, the studies cited in
the last two paragraphs combine private and public investment in their regressions. A recent study
by Argimon, Gonzales-Paramo, and Roldan (1997) separates private from public investment. In so
doing, however, they must restrict their analysis to 14 OECD countries over the 1978 to 1989
period, since the Summers and Heston data only provide a breakout of private and public
investment for this restricted subset of their database. Argimon, Gonzales-Paramo, and Roldan
(1997) consider the effects, if any, of public consumption and public investment on private
investment, finding that public consumption and public investment associate negatively with
private investment, although only the public consumption effect is significant.

i

A very few studies do examine the effects of disaggregated government expenditure on economic growth,
however (e.g., Miller and Russek, 1997 and Devarajan et. al., 1996).
ii

They use the investment share of GDP from the World Bank database. This measure consolidates private
and public investment.
iii

Fischer also uses World Bank data on the capital stock and takes the change in the capital stock to
generate the investment series that includes both private and public investment.
iv

While Bairam and Ward (1993) indicate that they use private investment, the Summers and Heston
database, which they use, does not provide private and public investment series for all 25 countries over
the 1950 to 1988 sample. Rather, Bairam and Ward (1993) must use an investment series that includes
private plus public investment.

We examine the effects of different fiscal variables on domestic investment at a more
disaggregated level. By introducing a government budget constraint, we also distinguish between
tax- and debt-financed expenditure. We use pooled time-series, cross-section data (39 countries
over the period 1975 to 1984) to estimate our results. Fixed- and random-effects econometric
techniques accommodate structural differences between countries. We divide our sample into
developed and developing countries to determine if systematic differences exist between those two
groups.

2.

Empirical Model, Data, and Results
We employ the method of Miller and Russek (1997) to introduce the government budget

constraint into our regression equations. The government budget constraint, an identity, states that
the difference between total tax revenue (tx) and the sum of expenditure on different categories
(exp) constitutes the budget surplus (sur). Dividing both sides of the budget constraint by gross
domestic product (GDP) gives the relationship as a share of GDP.
We run two sets of regressions. One set uses total government expenditure while the other
uses disaggregated expenditure items. The different categories of government expenditure
considered include defense expenditure to GDP (edfs), education expenditure to GDP (eed), health
expenditure to GDP (ehlh), social security and welfare expenditure to GDP (essw), economic
affairs and service expenditure to GDP (eeas), transportation and communication expenditure to
GDP (etc), and other expenditure to GDP (eoe).
We also include a trade variable, defined as the import plus export share of GDP (opn),
because Levine and Renelt (1992), using sensitivity analysis, find that only trade variables (such
as the import plus export share of GDP and other measures of openness) explain investment
robustly. We estimate the following regression equations:
(1)

ivtct = a1 + a2 txct + a3 expct + a4 opnct + vct , and

(2)

ivtct = b1 + b2 txct + b3 edfs ct + b4 eedct + b5 ehlhct + b6 esswct
+ b7 eeasct + b8 etcct + b9 eoect + b10 opnct + vct,

where ivt is the investment share of GDP, and c and t indicate country and time period,
respectively. Note that because the government budget constraint is an identity, we must omit one
of the fiscal variables. In equations (1) and (2), we omit the government surplus to GDP (sur).
Including total tax revenue and excluding the government surplus from the regression implies that

the coefficients of different expenditure items show the effects of debt-financed increases in
expenditure on investment.v For example, the coefficient a3 in equation (1) captures the effect of a
change in government expenditure on investment, holding taxes constant. Since taxes do not adjust,
the increase in government expenditure implies a decrease in the government surplus. Thus, the
increase in government expenditure is financed with government debt -- either money or bonds.
Similarly, to examine the effects of tax-financed expenditure on investment, we modify equations
(1) and (2) by including the government surplus and excluding total tax revenue from the
regression. Now, the coefficient a3 measures the effect of an increase in government expenditure on
investment, holding the surplus constant. In other words, the increase in government expenditure is
financed by higher taxes such that the surplus does not change.
The standard method in empirical country studies estimates regression equations with
ordinary least squares (OLS) (e.g., Levine and Renelt, 1992, Fischer, 1993), which assumes that
the omitted variables are independent of the regressors and are independently, identically
distributed. Such estimation, however, can create problems of interpretation if country-specific
characteristics, such as political regimes, policy changes, and so on that affect investment, are not
considered (see Levine and Zervos, 1993, p. 420). If those omitted country-specific variables
(both observed and unobserved) correlate with the explanatory variables, then OLS produces
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Hsiao, 1986). The use of panel data, however,
provides an approach to address that problem.
Suppose we omit country-specific variables that correlate with the included regressors.
Then the fixed-effect model produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients.
Without that adjustment, OLS produces biased and inconsistent estimates.vi
The fixed-effect model assumes that differences across units reflect parametric shifts in the
regression equation. Such an interpretation becomes more appropriate when the problem at hand
uses the whole population rather than a sample from it. If the problem examines only a sample
from a larger population, then the fixed-effect model may properly apply only to the differences
within that sample. In such cases, the random-effect model may be appropriate. Since our sample

v

All variables in the regressions are deflated by GDP. Future reference to those variables omits the
mention of the deflation by GDP. That is, investment means investment to GDP.
vi

Another method of excluding unobserved country-specific variables estimates the first-differenced
regression (see Hsiao, 1986, and Westbrook and Tybout, 1993).

considers 39 countries over a particular time period, the random-effect model deserves
consideration. The random-effect model, however, also produces biased estimates if the omitted
country-specific variables correlate with the included regressors.
We use different test statistics to compare the alternative specifications. An F-test judges
the performance of the fixed-effect model against the OLS model (Greene 1990, p. 484). A
Lagrange-Multiplier test due to Bruesch and Pagan (1980) assesses the random-effect model
against the OLS model (Greene 1990, p. 491-92). Finally, a Wald criterion due to Hausman
(1978) appraises the fixed-effect model against the random-effect model (Greene 1990, p. 495).
We assemble annual data on 39 countries for the period of 1975 to 1984 from two
sources.vii Data on gross domestic investment, imports and exports of goods and non-financial
services, and GDP come from the World Bank data tape and information on central government
revenue and expenditure come from the data tape on Government Finance Statistics compiled by
International Monetary Fund. We note that the gross domestic investment reported by the World
Bank includes both private and public investment. Government expenditure categories include total
expenditure, defense expenditure, education expenditure, health expenditure, social security and
welfare expenditure, economic affairs and service expenditure, and transportation and
communication expenditure. From those expenditure items, we create a residual other expenditure.
We further note that the expenditure data from the Government Financial Statistics include both
current and capital spending. We divide the variables by GDP to calculate GDP shares.
We estimate two specifications of equations (1) and (2) with OLS, fixed-effect, and
random-effect models for three sets of data, one with the full sample of 39 countries, another
including 23 developing countries, and the last constituting of 16 developed countries. One
specification includes total taxes (and excludes the government surplus) to see the effect of debtfinanced government expenditure on investment; the other specification includes the government
surplus (and excludes total taxes) to analyze the effect of tax-financed government expenditure. Of

vii

We use the data set from Miller and Russek (1997), who give a more-detailed discussion of the data in
their appendix. The countries included in our analysis are Australia (D), Austria (D), Barbados, Belgium
(D), Botswana, Brazil, Canada (D), Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark (D), El Salvador, Finland (D), France (D),
Germany (D), Iceland (D), Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Korea, Liberia, Luxembourg (D), Malawi, Mauritius,
Morocco, Netherlands (D), New Zealand, Paraguay, Spain (D), Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden (D),
Switzerland (D), Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom (D), United States (D), Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Zambia. A (D) denotes countries included in the developed country sub-sample; the remaining countries
belong to the developing country sub-sample.

the three models, the fixed-effect model dominates in all cases. As such, we only report results
from the fixed-effect, along with the relevant test statistics in Tables 1-4.
As noted above, our measure of investment includes private and public investment and the
government expenditure measures include current and capital spending. As a result, we must
interpret our findings carefully. When government expenditure rises, some of that increase, but not
all, is capital spending. Moreover, the domestic investment includes government capital spending.
Thus, some positive correlation is expected between government expenditure, or its components,
and investment expenditure. Such induced correlation, however, should be less than one. As a
consequence, we shall focus on those results where the effects are negative or larger than one, if
positive.viii
Table 1 reports the results of debt-financed aggregate government expenditure. Several
observations emerge. First, the openness variable has a significant positive effect on investment in
the full sample. That result, which matches the finding in Levine and Renelt (1992), however,
carries over only to the developing country sub-sample. So, the robust result found by Levine and
Renelt (1992) does not hold for developed countries. Second, while debt-financed total
government expenditure has no significant effect for the full sample, it has a positive effect in
developing countries and a negative effect in developed countries. That seeming contradiction
resolves itself when we look at the effects of disaggregated government expenditure on investment
for the two groups of countries in due course. Finally, an increase in taxes holding government
expenditure constant (i.e., a higher surplus or a lower deficit) reduces the investment share of GDP
in the full-sample and in the developing countries.ix

viii

One referee notes that we use central-(federal-)government data on taxes and spending. These data
exclude state and local information as well as information of state-owned enterprises. Were we to use
consolidated data on central and state-and-local governments, however, our sample would be reduced to a
handful of countries, since few countries report the breakdown of government spending at the state-andlocal level. This same referee argues that if these three sources are positively correlated, then a $1 rise in
central-government investment spending could correspond to a larger than $1 increase in central, stateand-local, and state-owned enterprise investment spending. As a result, we may find coefficients greater
than one, according to this referee. While we grant the referee the theoretical point, we do not think that it
is a practical concern. We reiterate that the government spending series that we use in our regression
analysis incorporate both consumption and investment spending. Thus, a $1 increase in a governmentspending category does not mean a $1 increase in government investment spending. Nonetheless, this
referee has a good point and the reader needs to interpret our findings carefully.
ix

Developed countries exhibit a positive effect for an increase in taxes, although only at the 20-percent
significance level.

Table 2 reports the findings of tax-financed aggregate government expenditure. In that case,
total government expenditure crowds out investment in all three samples. Thus, to the extent that
debt-financed government expenditure has a positive effect on investment (i.e., for developing
countries), that is reversed when the government expenditure is financed with taxes. Of course,
those results reflect aggregate government expenditure. We really need to examine the effects of
the different components of government expenditure, to which we now turn.
Table 3 reports the effects of debt-financed components of government expenditure on
investment. Now, limiting our discussion to those government expenditure items that affect
investment significantly at the 5-percent significance level, we observe that when considering all
countries, expenditure on social security and welfare crowds out investment, while expenditure on
transport and communication crowds in investment. That latter effect needs careful interpretation,
as noted above, since a portion of transport and communication expenditure is capital spending.
What is of interest, however, is that the coefficient of transport and communication expenditure
significantly exceeds one. Thus, even if every dollar of transportation and communication
expenditure appears in total domestic investment, which it does not, transportation and
communication expenditure associates with additional higher private domestic investment. The
developing countries yield the same outcome. For the developed countries, however, the
significance of transport and communication expenditure disappears, but health expenditure and
other expenditure also crowd out investment. x
Table 4 reports the effects of tax-financed components of government expenditure on
investment. When considering the full sample and the 5-percent significance level, all government
expenditure items crowd out investment except transportation and communication expenditure,
which crowds in investment. For developing countries, government expenditure on transportation
and communication still induces investment and government expenditure on social security and
welfare still reduces investment. Once again, the coefficient of transportation and communication
expenditure significantly exceeds one for the full and the developing-country samples only. Now,
expenditure on defense reduces investment in developing countries. In developed countries, taxfinanced expenditures on health, social security and welfare, and other expenditure all reduce
investment.

Finally, the disaggregated results help to resolve the seeming contradiction for aggregate
government expenditure reported in Table 1. To wit, debt-financed aggregate government
expenditure associates with higher investment in developing countries and lower investment in
developed countries. Our disaggregated results show that only transportation and communication
expenditure significantly crowds in investment, and then only in developing countries. Thus, the
positive link between aggregate government expenditure and domestic investment in developing
countries results from the strong, large effect of transportation and communication expenditure. No
strong, positive link exists for developed countries and, thus, the negative effect of aggregate
government expenditure emerges.

3.

Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, two different views exist on the effect of government

expenditure on investment -- the traditional crowding out and the non-traditional crowding in
views. Our empirical findings support both views of how government expenditure effects domestic
investment. Several government expenditure items crowd out investment. One expenditure item,
transport and communication expenditure, crowds in investment in developing countries.
Our results also produce several other conclusions. First, the openness variable has a
significantly positive effect on investment only for developing countries. For developed countries,
openness does not significantly affect investment. Thus, the robust finding of Levine and Renelt
(1992) that openness affects investment, their second conclusion, does not hold when the sample is
divided into developed and developing countries.
Second, expenditure on transport and communication, as just noted, crowds in investment
for developing countries only. That finding may suggest that there may be an optimal level of
government expenditure. Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) rationalize their findings of either
no or negative effects of the components of government expenditure on the growth of real per
capita GDP by arguing that the level of expenditure in the categories of negative effects must have
gone beyond the optimum level. Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) state that "Seemingly
productive expenditures may be unproductive if there is an excessive amount of them." (338). We
find that transportation and communication expenditure significantly crowds in investment to GDP
x

Debt-financed defense and education expenditure have negative effects, if the significance level moves to

for developing countries in our sample; Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) find either a
negative or no effect of transportation and communication expenditure on growth rate of real per
capita GDP, contrary to the work of Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
Another explanation for our transportation and communication expenditure result appears
especially appropriate, however. Fernald (1999) examines the effects of the growth of roads on
productivity in the United States. He concludes that “… the massive road-building of the 1950’s
and 1960’s offered a one-time boost to the level of productivity, rather than a path to continuing
rapid growth in productivity.” (p. 621). This interpretation suggests that transportation and
communication expenditure may stimulate private investment during the initial build-up of
transportation and communication infrastructure. Once the basic structure exists, however, further
effects may diminish or disappear. This may explain our finding of a positive effect only in
developing countries, where the transportation and communication infrastructures are still in their
initial build-up.
Third, tax-financed government expenditure, in general, crowds out investment more
frequently than debt-financed government expenditure. That finding may suggest the existence of
liquidity constraints within the economy.
Finally, expenditure on social security and welfare crowds out investment for both tax- and
debt-financed increases and in both developed and developing countries. That is the only category
of government expenditure that had such a consistent (negative) effect on investment across all
specifications

the 20-percent level.

Table 1: Fixed-Effect Model for Debt-Financed Aggregate Government Expenditure
(Dependent variable: Investment Share of GDP)
_____________________________________________________________________
All Countries

Developing Countries Developed Countries

_____________________________________________________________________
tx
exp
opn

-0.266*
(-2.67)
-0.072
(-0.86)
0.166*
(5.68)

-0.413*
(-3.35)
0.196***
(1.75)
0.252*
(6.42)

F-test

0.225
(1.51)
-0.630*
(-6.28)
0.027
(0.91)

9.22*
8.79*
14.05*
(38,348)
(22,204)
(15,141)
Wald-test
14.78*
21.15*
6.73***
(3)
(3)
(3)
SEE
0.042
0.049
0.018
_____________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. The degrees of freedom for the F-tests are
given in parentheses; they test the fixed-effect model against the ordinary least squares
model, which is the null hypothesis. The Wald tests are chi-squared distributions with
degrees of freedom given in the parentheses; they test the fixed-effect against the
random-effect model, which is the null hypothesis. Green (1990, Ch. 16) provides the
various test statistics and their interpretation. SEE is the standard error of the
regression.
*
**
***

means significant at the 1-percent level.
means significant at the 5-percent level.
means significant at the 10-percent level.

Table 2: Fixed-Effect Model for Tax-Financed Aggregate Government Expenditure
(Dependent variable: Investment Share of GDP)
_____________________________________________________________________
All Countries

Developing Countries Developed Countries

_____________________________________________________________________
sur
exp
opn

-0.266*
(-2.67)
-0.338*
(-3.94)
0.166*
(5.68)

-0.413*
(-3.35)
-0.217***
(-1.96)
0.252*
(6.42)

F-test

0.225
(1.51)
-0.405*
(-4.04)
0.027
(0.91)

9.22*
8.79*
14.05*
(38,348)
(22,204)
(15,141)
Wald-test
14.78*
21.15*
6.73***
(3)
(3)
(3)
SEE
0.042
0.049
0.018
_____________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
See Table 1.
*
**
***

means significant at the 1-percent level.
means significant at the 5-percent level.
means significant at the 10-percent level.

Table 3: Fixed-Effect Model for Debt-Financed Government Expenditure (Dependent
variable: Investment Share of GDP)
_____________________________________________________________________
All Countries

Developing Countries Developed Countries

_____________________________________________________________________
tx
edfs
eed
ehlh
essw
eeas
etc
eoe
opn

-0.177***
(-1.87)
-0.344
(-1.52)
-0.683***
(-1.68)
-0.663***
(-1.80)
-1.034*
(-5.70)
-0.157
(-0.89)
2.153*
(6.29)
-0.141
(-1.22)
0.165*
(6.19)

-0.305**
(-2.47)
-0.299
(-1.06)
-0.675
(-1.32)
-0.483
(-0.89)
-0.939*
(-2.67)
-0.003
(0.01)
2.035*
(4.71)
0.033
(0.21)
0.227*
(6.07)

F-test

0.259***
(1.79)
-1.138
(-1.44)
-1.507***
(-1.84)
-1.101*
(-3.22)
-0.765*
(-4.82)
0.480
(1.19)
0.232
(0.24)
-0.791*
(-4.52)
0.157
(0.48)

8.44*
8.35*
5.17*
(38,342)
(22,198)
(15,135)
Wald-test
61.64*
37.92*
31.86*
(9)
(9)
(9)
SEE
0.038
0.046
0.017
_____________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
See Table 1.
*
**
***

means significant at the 1-percent level.
means significant at the 5-percent level.
means significant at the 10-percent level.

Table 4: Fixed-Effect Model for Tax-Financed Government Expenditure (Dependent
variable: Investment Share of GDP)
_____________________________________________________________________
All Countries

Developing Countries Developed Countries

_____________________________________________________________________
sur
edfs
eed
ehlh
essw
eeas
etc
eoe
opn

-0.177***
(-1.87)
-0.522**
(-2.53)
-0.860**
(-2.03)
-0.840**
(-2.27)
-1.211*
(-6.52)
-0.334**
(-2.03)
1.975*
(5.45)
-0.319*
(-2.78)
0.165*
(6.19)

-0.305**
(-2.47)
-0.605*
(-2.37)
-0.980***
(-1.84)
-0.788
(-1.43)
-1.244*
(-3.51)
-0.302
(-1.39)
1.730*
(3.75)
-0.273***
(-1.87)
0.227*
(6.07)

F-test

0.259***
(1.79)
-0.879
(-1.09)
-1.248
(-1.48)
-0.842*
(-2.61)
-0.506*
(-3.63)
0.739***
(1.85)
0.491
(0.51)
-0.532*
(-2.86)
0.157
(0.48)

8.44*
8.35*
5.17*
(38,342)
(22,198)
(15,135)
Wald-test
61.64*
37.92*
31.86*
(9)
(9)
(9)
SEE
0.038
0.046
0.017
_____________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
See Table 1.
*
**
***

means significant at the 1-percent level.
means significant at the 5-percent level.
means significant at the 10-percent level.
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